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CHAPTER EIGHTEEN
THE ROLE OF THE GRAIN MARKETING BOARD IN SERVING 
COMMUNAL FARMERS IN ZIMBABWE: A RESEARCH PROPOSAL
M.T. Muchero 
INTRODUCTION
In the "managed" economies of today Government intervention 
in the field of agriculture is a recognised, if not entire­
ly acceptable feature. Successive governments have inter­
vened in a number of ways to assist agricultural producers 
in marketing their commodities. This intervention has 
assumed various forms, such as direct control on the market­
ing of commodities, the registration of producers, the 
licensing of farmers and other more indirect forms such as, 
import and export control on commodities. (GMB, 1959).
Government intervention in agricultural marketing is wide­
spread in both developed and developing countries and 
public sector marketing agencies are accepted as a politi­
cal imperative in most African countries (Child, Muir- 
Leresche and Blackie, 1985). This view is shared by Todaro 
(1977) in his discussion on agricultural and rural develop­
ment when he states that the full benefits of small-scale 
agricultural development cannot be realised unless govern­
ment support systems are created which provide the neces­
sary incentives, economic opportunities and access to 
needed imputs to enable small cultivators to expand their 
output and raise their productivity. Zimbabwe is no-excep­
tion to this generalization. Reacting to the needs and 
requests of large-scale farmers when world prices fell 
below production costs in the early 1930s, the Maize 
Control Act came into being, thereby, laying the founda­
tions of the present Grain Maketing Board (GMB, 1959). The 
extent to which the benefits of marketing efficiences are 
achieved and passed on to farmers in the form of higher 
prices or reduced marketing costs depends in large part on
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the competitive structure of the marketing agencies 
(Mellor, 1974).
The development of efficient, low cost marketing systems is 
fundamental to successful agricultural development (Child, 
Muir-Leresche and Blackie, 1985). Through the provision of 
economic incentives and the stimulation of innovation 
(Mittendorf, 1981), such systems can be achieved. Some of 
the major issues that dominate any discussion of strategies 
for the development of more effective marketing systems in­
clude: the need to design marketing systems that are able 
to deal satisfactorily with the increased food supplies re­
quired to feed rapidly growing urban populations, the means 
by which the subsistence and semi-subsistence producers can 
be integrated into the marketing systems; and the effective 
use of pricing policies as an important stimulant of agri­
cultural production (Mittendorf, 1981).
With respect to the first two issues described above, the 
research programme for my D. Phil dissertation at the Uni­
versity of Zimbabwe will concentrate on how the GMB can 
deal satisfactorily with purchasing surplus food from com­
munal farmers and the integration of the communal sector, 
into the commercial economy. The third regarding pricing 
will be discussed only in the limited aspect of marketing 
costs incurred by producers. This brings me to my hypothe­
sis which states that:
The current structure of the Grain Marketing Board 
is not well adapted to service the demands imposed 
on it by the communal sector. This dissertation 
will examine options available for adoption by the 
Grain Marketing Board in its efforts to expand its 
marketing services to the communal agricultural 
sector.
ASSUMPTIONS
There are two main underlying assumptions in this disser­
tation :
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First, controlled marketing answers a real political and 
economic need in Zimbabwe. The uncertainty of food 
production and the difficulties of trade in food in
Southern Africa are such that governments are unlikely to 
gamble on private trading to supply the market. Govern­
ments of such different political persuasions and economic 
strengths as some developed western countries rely exten­
sively on private sector investment in food marketing. 
Gsaenger and Schmidt have shown that, with low income and 
price elasticities of demand for maize, consumer welfare 
(particularly of low income groups) will fluctuate widely 
under free market conditions - an undesirable and politi­
cally destabilizing situation. Their analysis of the
welfare effects of various stabilization schemes indicates 
that price stabilization are due to random shifts in 
supply. This is the case in Zimbabwe where maize produc­
tion is highly influenced by annual variations in rainfall 
(Child, Muir-Leresche and Blackie, 1985).
Second, existing public food marketing agencies are not 
inherently inefficient. They have, however, been designed 
primarily to serve large farmers. It is the simple 
expansion of such agencies to serve small-scale farmers in 
recent years that underlies their poor performance in many 
countries. The efficiency of such agencies can be
significantly improved if their design is altered in 
accordance with their functions. (Child, Muir-Leresche and 
Blackie, 1985).
It is noted that it is very difficult to change marketing 
systems that are well established, tried and trusted. It 
is not the intention of this dissertation to generate infor­
mation on how to replace the GMB but to figure out how to 
help place more emphasis on communal producers and at the 
same time, operate at low cost.
The GMB is a producer initiated, single channel marketing 
system, which, in most years, has fulfilled its objectives
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of maintinaing national food self-sufficiency (Child, Muir- 
Leresche and Blackie, 1985). The Grain Marketing Board has 
effectively serviced the needs of the large-scale 
commercial farmers who were the founding force of the GMB 
system. Its whole structure has been built around and for 
use mainly by commercial farmers. The large concentration 
of GMB marketing facilites, or depots in these areas is 
evidence of its emphasis in that sector.
The second assumption refers to the simple expansion of 
existing government marketing agencies to cater for small
farmer requirements as the main cause of poor performance
by those ‘agencies. Examples can be cited in a number of 
African countries which, on attaining independence, have 
simply expanded existing marketing systems to cater for 
small-scale farmers without making corresponding 
adjustments in the nature and structure of the marketing
systems. The result has been poor performance.
Zimbabwe appears to be falling into the same trap as other 
African countries as experience in the first five years 
since independence appears to indicate. The purpose of
this dissertation is to analyse the GMB marketing system 
and suggest changes in order to prevent the collapse of the 
system as has happened in many African countries.
Since independence in 1980, the government of Zimbabwe has 
concentrated on the preivously neglected communal sector. 
It places greater emphasis on the provision of adequate 
marketing facilities to service the communal sector. A 
number of senior government officials have stated during 
public addresses that GMB depots should be sited in such a 
manner that they service farmers within a small radius. 
This new policy aims at improving the standard of living in 
communal areas by way of, among other things, reducing the 
cost of marketing surplus produce. The current GMB 
marketing system is looked upon to provide such expanded 
serivce by simply extending further afield. Its present
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structure is not well adapted to service the new demands 
imposed on it by the communal agricultural sector. This is 
evidenced by the large increases in operating costs as more 
small depots are established. It is therefore necessary to 
examine the options available that can be adopted in 
expanding marketing services to the communal agricultural 
sector.
OBJECTIVES
The objectives of this study are to examine:
1. whether the present GMB marketing system can be
sustained, firstly in the communal sector and 
secondly, in the large- and small-scale commerical 
sectors and communal sector, in view of its
rapidly changing clientele.
2. whether the provision of marketing systems which
are complimentary to the GMB system is a viable 
proposition
3. whether the provision of marketing systems which
compete with the GMB are a practical solution to 
meeting the added demands.
To tackle the above issues it is necessary :-
a) to determine how much further the GMB can expand
its facilities to service the increasing demands 
of the communal sector without losing efficiency 
in carrying out its duties and functions.
b) to condider what options exist which would allow
for the expansion of existing facilities or the 
creation of alternative facilities to service the
communal sector.
c) to determine the impact of economically feasible
options on government objectives.
d) to determine which of these options are most
acceptable politically
LITERATURE REVIEW
During the early part of the century colonial policies, as 
related to African grain production, changed in order to 
suit the settlers' requirements. In times of drought or
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war, African production was encouraged to augment short­
falls in settler production. In good times, government pol­
icies tended to suppress the African producer. The African 
producer was therefore viewed as an emergency supplier, 
otherwise considered not important in agricultural expan­
sion and development in general. This view is explained by 
Tickner (1979 ) when he reports that as a result of food
shortages during the Second World War, restrictive policies 
towards Afican farmers were relaxed and African agriculture 
received some encouragement. He goes on to say that, al­
though some individuals in government service and some 
private white farmers continued to give suppport to African 
producers to remain in the market, the nature of structures 
that existed meant that African farmers were being steadily 
squeezed out of the market. Tickner (1979) records that 
whereas in 1955 Africans sold 30 percent of their agricul­
tural produce, by 1970 this proportion had dropped to 19
percent.
Since independence, the government has placed greater em­
phasis on African, or communal agriculture. This was
expressed clearly in its First Five Year Plan 1986-1990. 
In direct contrast to suppressive government policies of 
the first half of the century, this government views com­
munal production as being the pivotal point around which 
the country's true development revolves. Tickner (1979) 
says that African producers need to be viewed not just as 
subsistence producers with peripheral interests in the 
market economy but more as producers who, if given the 
opportunity, can and would become more market orientated 
producers.
Tickner (1979 ) went on to say that communal producers often 
found it (and still do) in the majority of cases, uneconom­
ic to compete in the market as they are limited by their 
own productive capacity, their consumption requirements, 
their proverty their inability to obtain finance and to ben­
efit from economies of scale and technological developments
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as well as restrictive structures in marketing and trans­
port. Uma Lele (1974) states that the goal of the 
marketing system must be to minimize costs of distribution, 
to reduce spatial and seasonal price flucutations and to 
handle efficiently the increased marketable surpluses
emanating from expanding production. To be effective Lele 
(1974) continues, a market system must also reach a large 
number of farmers. A market organization that fails to do 
so, however well conceived, would not serve the purpsoe, 
either of reducing overall marketing margins or of 
providing an incentive price to boast agricultural
production generally. Lele (1974) goes on to say that the
effeciency of any market system, whether private, public or 
co-operative, cannot be increased unless the risk and 
uncertainty in marketing can be reduced by removing basic 
constraints such as poor transport, storage and processing 
facilites, poor market information systems, lack of
standardisation of weights and measures and inadequate 
and/or poorly administered credit facilities. Given the 
production problems faced by communal products this 
dissertation is confined to market facilities constraint.
The policy of the Agricultural Marketing Authority (AMA) 
and its four constituent Boards prior to Independence was 
clearly stated that:
"The Agricultural Marketing Authority recognises 
the key role which the provision of marketing ser­
vices can play in the development of agriculture 
in areas remote from the main centres of develop­
ment. However, its prime function is not to act 
as a development agency, but to ensure that farm 
produce is handled efficiently and at the least 
cost to the country, while ensuring that returns 
from sales are maximised. Our marketing institu­
tions have played a key role in the development of 
Agriculture in Rhodesia, by pursuing this object­
ive with single minded determination. It is the 
Authority's intention that this should remain its 
prime concern" (Tickner, 1979).
In practice, this policy has meant that African producers
in remote (and hence expensive) areas have usually been
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poorly helped by the marketing authorities. The transporta­
tion system of roads and rail that exist predominantly in 
European areas, along with a payment structure to farmers 
that is based on the principle of farmers meeting their 
primary marketing costs to points of sale (which are mainly 
located at processing plants and points accessible to the 
transportation system) have meant that many African farmers 
have been disadvantaged in marketing their produce 
(Tickner, 1979).
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE GRAIN MARKETING BOARD
The first embryonic stage in orderly marketing was when a 
small group of maize farmers negotiated with the mines of 
Mazowe in 1909. Controlled marketing of maize and the 
provision of guaranteed markets and prices were taken more 
seriously beginning in 1931, a period of acute depression 
when world prices of maize fell below production costs. In 
1936, the Maize Control Board was established in an effort 
to stabilize farm incomes and continued farm settlement. 
In 1957, the Maize Control Act was repealed and replaced by 
the Grain marketing act which promulgated the establishment 
of the GMB.
Functions and Duties of the Grain Marketing Board
The GMB has since evolved to perform the following 
functions:
a) to ensure the orderly marketing of controlled
products;
b) to buy and sell any controlled product which is
delivered to or acquired by it;
c) to provide storage, handling and processing
facilities for controlled products;
d) to maintain stocks of controlled products as it
may consider necessary;
e) to import and export contoiled products as it may
consider necessary.
f) to do such things whether in relation to a
controlled product or not as may be required by 
the Minister of Lands, Agriculture and Rural 
Resettlement.
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This dissertation will examine the structure of the Board 
in respect of its first three functions mentioned above as 
they relate to communal producers. In its early stages GMB 
facilities were situated on line of rail with the producer 
price payable at these centres to any producer. European 
producers were responsible for actual costs of transport, 
from the farm gate to line of rail, whereas African 
producers were called upon to bear an equalised transport 
deduction irrespective of their points of production. It 
is stated that this arose from the fact that the majority 
of African producers were unable to bulk and transport 
their products to line of rail and that arrangements had to 
be made fbr some organisation to undertake this task on 
their behalf (GMB, 1963). This gave rise to what are now 
known as Approved Buyers. The equalised transport levy was 
deducted from the producer price. In addition, an
agricultural levy and handling charge were deducted. The 
levy, a form of agricultural taxation was employed for use 
in African development (GMB, 1963).
It its written evidence to the Commission of Inquiry into 
the Agricultural Industry in April 1981, the Agricultural 
Marketing Authority went into some detail describing the 
development of primary marketing services in Zimbabwe. The 
following is a brief account of the major issues raised.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF PRIMARY MARKETING SERVICES
a ) Primary Marketing
The term primary marketing has been used in 
Zimbabwe to describe that marketing process from 
farm gate to central marketing depots. The term 
includes those other stages of marketing such as 
central storage, processing and distribution.
Within the diverse structure of Zimbabwe's
agricultural base there exists a disparity in the 
ability of primary agricultural producers to
overcome the probleming of this primary marketing 
stage (i.e. bulking up of produce, identification 
of product, transport to central marketing
depots). For many years debate has ensued as to 
where the responsibility to the GMB commences, the
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issue hinges upon the question as to whether the 
Board itself should fulfil a greater development 
role in conjunction with its marketing role. In re­
cent years the option has favoured the board's as­
suming a greater level of responsibility at the de­
velopmental stage. As a result, policies have 
been established which envisage a far greater 
spread of market intake points throughout the coun­
try for certain categories of controlled products.
b) "Line of Rail" Intake
An elementary concept in the theory of comparative 
advantage lays stress on the significance of dis­
tance from the market in the level of remuneration 
to the producer of any pocket. The importance of 
this concept was not lost to the earlier policy ma­
kers. The crucial importance of transport (which 
in earlier years was synonimous with the railways) 
in the marketing system, no doubt led to the adop­
tion of the "line of rail" price fixing system for 
controlled products. Whilst this policy may have 
been satisfacotry in the initial stages of trans­
portation development it probably presupposed that 
the rail network would have been enlarged to a far 
greater extent than has been the case.
c) "Off Line of Rail" Intake
In recent times, with the sharp increase in grain 
output, particularly in Mashonaland, certain areas 
have been confronted with major transportation and 
storage problems. This has led to a gradual 
erosion of the "line of rail" policy and several 
marketing depots have been established "off the 
line of rail". Initially the cost of transporting 
this grain to the line of rail was met by a direct 
government subsidy. From 1977 onwards those costs 
have been a direct handling charge to the Board.
With this development it was a short step to 
extend the marketing strategy. Accordingly in 
1970 the government agreed to the adoption of a 
policy which has the long term objective of provid­
ing marketing depots throughout the country on an 
intensive scale. The concept of this policy is 
that ultimately no producer should have to travel 
more than sixty kilometres in order to deliver his 
product. This move would obviously lead to pres­
sure from various producer interests for the estab­
lishment of depots within their area of interest. 
Therefore it has been necessary to devise certain 
criteria for determining relative priorities. 
Such criteria require that a locality should 
already be a significant producer of particular 
controlled products and have the potential to 
increase its output.
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MARKETING IN MALAWI
The marketing system of commodities in Malawi is similar in 
some ways to that of the GMB of Zimbabwe. In Malawi the 
Agricultural Development and Marketing Corporation 
(ADMARC), is charged solely with the responsibility of 
purchasing agricultural produce from smallholders. Other 
organizations in the private sector particpate in the trade 
of commodities produced by commercial farmers. There are 
four agricultural produce marketing channels in Malawi.
a) ADMARC, as a public enterprise buying from
smallholders;
b) es.tates or commercial producers selling directly 
to mills and export markets;
c) private traders or middlemen, who are licensed by 
ADMARC to buy and sell to ADMARC; and
d) the farmer himself disposing his produce through 
the local markets in small lots (Paper 2, 1985).
In 1984, ADMARC had 74 main storage depots/markets for the 
various crops, supplemented by over 1020 seasonal
produce-buying centres. These systems of buying centres 
and buying agents or private traders are in use by these
countries so far considered, Kenya, Malawi and Zimbabwe.
But Malawi's use of the buying centres is much more 
pronounced. Therefore a system deserving greater scrutiny 
as a method of expanding market outlets. Malawi's two tier 
agricultural marketing system, namely the estate sub-sector 
which operates under the framework of free marketing and 
price determination and the smallholder sub-sector which 
operates through ADMARC, is unique (Paper 3, 1985 ) and • very 
valuable to this dissertation.
MARKETING IN KENYA
The marketing system for agricultural commodities in Kenya 
is similar to that of the GMB. The Kenyan marketinq system 
in Zimbabwe was set up in the 1930's to serve both domestic 
and Second World War requirements. With the passage of 
time this system expanded, and modified to handle a wide
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range of commodities (Paper 1, 1985). One of the
government objectives is to ensure socio-economic and 
political stability. In order to achieve these goals, 
certain control measures were applied on essential
foodstuffs and export crops. As in Zimbabwe, these include 
the provision of secure outlets for specified farm produce 
(Paper 2, 1985). In Kenya, the National Cereals and 
Produce Board (NCPB) is charged with the responsibility of 
purchasing and selling maize through its own buying centres 
as well as through agents. The only difference between the 
NCPB and the GMB is that the former is a buyer of last 
resort whereas the latter is the sole buyer of surplus
iproduce. The NCPB, however, controls maize purchases by 
issuing movement permits to traders (Paper 1, 1935). All 
in all, therefore the NCPB deals in direct competition with 
traders.
In my research, I shall study Kenya's experience in food 
marketing and its relevance to the GMB of Zimbabwe.
MARKETING IN TANZANIA
The marketing system in Tanzania is somewhat different to 
those briefly described above. In Tanzania, Cooperative
Unions play a major role in purchasing buy crops from the 
farmers through primary cooperative societies. The crops 
are then resold to other institutions, but principally to 
the National Milling Corporation (NMC) (Paper 4, 1985).
MARKETING IN ZAMBIA
In Zambia the National Agricultural Marketing Board 
(NAMBOARD) operates side by side with Cooperative Unions 
and its own registed traders. In deficit provinces, 
Cooperative Unions have a monopoly in terms of purchases of 
grains from farmers. Each NAMBOARD depot serves producers 
in a 25 kilimetre radius. Produce is bought and collected 
from the farm gate. Should the farmer opt to deliver for
himself he gets paid for the transpoort at government fixed 
rates for the distance travelled up to a maximum of 25 
kilometres.
SUMMARY
This paper presents a preliminary statement of my proposed 
research programme. I shall be grateful for comments from 
readers at this early stage of my D. Phil dissertation 
research in the Department of Agricultural Economics of the 
University of Zimbabwe.
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